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For the past decade, the academic debate on the possibility of human 
enhancement1 has produced quite a substantial record (Agar 2007). The 
youngest entry to the enhancement debate is the theme of moral enhance-
ment. This rising new fi eld of research, both scientifi c and philosophical, 
is “concerned not so much with the improvement of physical or cognitive 
capacities, but improvements in the way in which we act or refl ect morally,” 
(Raus et. al. 2014) and is very much fueled by the rapid progress in fi elds of 
neuro and cognitive sciences. Of the many possible approaches to moral en-
hancement, the biomedical approach has become the focal point upon which 
many spears have been shattered in the still ongoing debate’s two oppos-
ing camps. These are the proponents of the traditional moral enhancement 
which include approaches such as moral education, advancement of moral 
reasoning etc., and those, on the other side, who argue for a direct use of bio-
medical procedures in trying to advance human morality. As the possibility 
to enhance morality through biomedical procedures in the past years has 
become entrenched within the neuropharmacological capacity to facilitate 
these desired modifi cations, the debate, unfortunately, hasn’t quite moved 
on with novel explorations.
In this regard, Harry Wiseman’s most recent work Myth of the moral 
brain, in which he systematically and thoroughly engages the predominant 
approaches to moral bioenhancement, is more than a welcomed refresh-
ment and, for some, quite a realistic sobering. Wiseman’s work comes out 
just in the right time when other engaged scholars (including neuroscien-
tists) are also pointing out that the neuropharmacologically based propos-
als, which have received the biggest impetus, hold serious and somewhere 
even irreparable fl aws. For instance, Dubljević and Racine (2017) in their 
most recent contribution create a thorough assessment of currently pre-
dominant neuropharmacological options for the biomedical approach and 
fi nd them all wanting,2 Wiseman directly contributes to these fi ndings with 
1 “Human enhancement… aims to develop technologies and techniques for 
overcoming current limitations of human cognitive and physical abilities…rely 
on advances in genetic engineering, pharmacology, bioengineering, cybernetics, 
and nanotechnology. The envisioned applications are limitless, and include the 
enhancement of human traits like muscular strength, endurance, vision, intelligence, 
mood, and personality” (Brey 2009: 169). 
2 To name just a few of their important fi ndings, Oxytocin was found to promote 
trust, but only in the in-group, while with the out-group members of society it 
can decrease cooperation and selectively promote ethnocentrism, favoritism, and 
parochialism. Beta blockers were found to decrease racism but also blunt all emotional 
response which puts their effective usefulness in general doubt. SSRIs (Selective 
Serotonin Reactive Inhibitors) reduce (reactive) aggression, but have serious side-
effects, including an increased risk of suicide. Deep brain stimulation was found to 
have no effect whatsoever on moral behavior. And so they conclude that biomedical 
and especially neuropharmacological „techniques are all blunt instruments, rather 
than fi nely tuned technologies that could be helpful” (Dubljević and Racine 2017).
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a refreshing and, at many places, consummate entry as he aims to offer a 
realistic critique of the biomedical approach both in its philosophical mus-
ings and scientifi c underpinnings.  The main point, and a general motif, of 
the book is that we require a more realistic approach which Wiseman terms 
the “bio-psycho-social” (245) model inside which he aims to “base our ratio-
nales for moral enhancement upon this foundation of what is realistically 
possible” (53). The book thus, in general, should be recommended as a good 
entry point for anyone interested in the moral enhancement debate (at least 
in its analysis of the ongoing debate) as it aims to dissect the bloated vision 
of some moral enhancement scenarios as well as trying to show where does 
exactly real science stand on issues pertaining to it. Following, the book is 
divided into four main parts: Philosophy, Science, Faith, and Praxis. We 
will explore them in order.
In Philosophy, Wiseman focuses on the works of Ingmar Persson and 
Julian Savulescu, James Hughes, and Tom Douglas. The hardest hit of 
the three gets the Persson Savulescu duo. And this is not surprising since 
in general Persson and Savulescu’s approach has generated the broadest 
amount of critiques. Wiseman aims to deliver the killing blow as he con-
stantly engages their proposal throughout the entire book seeing it as a 
“hideous visage” a hypothesis that puts forward a “literally, morally en-
hance or die” (263). He believes that the Persson-Savulescu thesis has “re-
ally made a joke of this domain” (263) and hopes that this approach may 
“be abandoned by commentators completely, leaving nothing over and that 
it never be spoken of again” (263). The second, James Hughes, Wiseman 
credits as the “arch-transhumanist, perhaps the most intellectually cred-
ible of all transhumanists” (34) and engages his account of “voluntary vir-
tue engineering” which is all about how “you are free to morally enhance 
yourself in any way which encourages free society” (44). This ought to be 
done by linking neurochemical changes with achieving the desired liberal 
personality as the morally superior option. Even though he puts aside the 
notion of liberal moral superiority, Wiseman is not impressed with Hughes’ 
approach which he sees as a “clumsy way of conceptualizing the operations 
of moral enhancement” (46) since it cannot guarantee to attain its specifi c 
moral character results and at the same time ignores unexpected side ef-
fects. As the “arch-transhumanist” Hughes should be strong on science but 
this is exactly what Wiseman points out he lacks the most and through 
him aims to show the focal mistakes of “enthusiast” enhancement propo-
nents in general. Namely, that they are building up a “poorly evidenced and 
massively overoptimistic account of moral enhancement possibilities based 
on highly provisional and contested research” (46). Conclusively, Wiseman 
deems Hughes’ approach as “simply unrealistic” (46). The last one to be 
tackled, Tom Douglas receives the least critique given and even modest ac-
colades as although, “Douglas’s approach should not be taken as a com-
plete package, Douglas has managed to carve out a very limited but more 
realistic prospect for moral enhancement” (57). Douglas is not found to be 
guilty of enhancement enthusiasm but rather, according to Wiseman, offers 
a sober and precise outlook on the matter and from the looks of it could be 
taken as a proper example in evaluating the biomedical vision for moral 
enhancement. Still, his approach is seen only to best function with those 
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“moral problems that are predominantly or totally impulse-based rather 
than those requiring moral refl ection and discernment” (52).
The second part, Science, aims to establish how realistic are the con-
jectures between regulating different neurobiological substances such as 
hormones or neurotransmitters with a personal disposal to behave and 
think morally. Wiseman focuses on the central and most predominantly 
present themes: Oxytocin which is connected with empathy, trustworthi-
ness and generosity (Paul Zak), Serotonin which is connected with harm, 
fairness, and aggression (Molly Crockett) and Dopamine which is connected 
with rewarding behavior (Ed Boyden). The general conclusion Wiseman 
comes to is that none of these neurochemicals is powerful enough to ful-
fi ll the full scope required of the moral enhancement goal. Notwithstand-
ing the many and possibly permanent undesired side-effects, the current 
state of neuropharmacology is simply inadequate to create the desired ef-
fect of moral enhancement. For instance, Oxytocin has a “nudge” potential 
but only with those who are already disposed towards prosocial behavior 
or empathy. Serotonin, especially through the SSRI (Selective Serotonin 
Reuptake Inhibitors)—a broadly available neuropharmacological substance 
has received a substantial appraisal. But Wiseman shows that not only is 
it true that what SSRI might improve with respect to one kind of aggres-
sion, namely reactive aggression, they may worsen with respect to another, 
namely premeditated aggression but that the complexity of Serotonin de-
pendent systems (immune system for instance) is highly sensitively cali-
brated and purposely manipulating with Serotonin levels in the organism 
could lead to devastating side-effects (Therbeck-Chesterman 2013, Crockett 
2014). Thus, in summary, Wiseman tackles not only the inability of neuro-
pharmacology (he does applaud Boyden’s optogenetics approach with whom 
he shares a disbelief in neuropharm) to address the issue at hand  but also 
tackles the incorrect emotional frameworks inside which certain emotional 
states (aggression for instance) are seen as being almost necessarily mor-
ally inhibitory or unwanted. He also warns of those frameworks which place 
a sharp distinction between emotions and reasoning and thus espouse an 
incorrect view of human moral cognition and its underlying sub cognitive 
processes (Helion and Ochsner 2016).
After dealing with neuropharmacology Wiseman confronts another and 
perhaps even more important problem—that of conceptual and method-
ological frameworks found in moral enhancement research. He uses the ex-
ample of the recently given SSRI research (Molly Crocket) which has been 
viewed and consequently used by many researchers (Wiseman focuses on 
DeGrazia) as a very promising scientifi c result to reaffi rm the moral bioen-
hancement approach. Unfortunately for the enthusiasts, Wiseman confi rms 
another sober awakening (for the entire enterprise) by pointing out to a crit-
ical problem—that of external and ecological validity. He humorously (and 
almost ironically) remarks on the inadequate validity and thus usability 
of these scientifi c fi ndings since the experimental frameworks in place are 
neither contextualized nor embodied—a hallmark of real-life human moral-
ity. As he poignantly remarks: “Indeed, it does seem as if most of the science 
upon which moral enhancement enthusiasts draw is conducted either using 
Ivy League students, or mice” (117).  Wiseman in this regard calls in for a 
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much-needed refi nement of methodological and conceptual paradigms and 
for a case by case approach in dealing with issues of moral enhancement 
especially in evaluating certain moral traits since the scientifi c experiments 
made and philosophical frameworks built upon these fi ndings are detached 
from a real-life instantiation of expressing these traits. Additionally, he 
warns, scientists themselves sometimes publish their work with ingrained 
“seductive claims” which draw enthusiasts to infer conclusions that are, un-
fortunately in the end deemed incongruous. Additionally, even the best cog-
nitive science frameworks such as the “Crockett’s Jekyll and Hyde, Greene’s 
dual-process theory of moral functioning...” (101) are inadequate to be used 
as a clear-cut extrapolation for philosophical conclusions. As he humorously 
remarks that, for instance, the trolley problem dilemma cannot be viewed 
as a realistic scenario “unless one is Oedipus standing before the sphinx” 
(120) and concludes that “these reductive approaches which rip moral func-
tioning out of its meaningful contexts, strangle it through excessive con-
trol...and distort beyond all recognition and meaning the moral phenomena 
being investigated ... are simply not fi t for purpose” (126).
Finally, in the third and the fourth part aptly named Faith and Prax-
is, Wiseman’s proposal for moral enhancement is, it could be said, not far 
from that ancient Benedictine motto Ora et Labora. Thus, in the fi rst part, 
faith, Wiseman tries to offer a distilled number of core Christian theological 
points that portray a “Christian virtue ethical theology” (297) in putting 
forward a realistic attitude (the leitmotif of the book) which espouses that 
“moral enhancement cannot exist as a free-fl oating entity (as if apolitical, or 
here as a-religious), but rather needs to recognize the nature of the ground 
upon which it is to stand and build” (142). Since a big percentage of the 
human population, at least declaratively, are professing a certain religious 
stand, he takes that any “strong vision of moral enhancement will and must 
be understood in a way that can cater to the billions of persons who self-
identify with one faith tradition or another ... and who will not be satis-
fi ed by a generic account of moral enhancement which attempts to simply 
ignore crucial tenets of their faith” (142). In this regard, he echoes some of 
the growing concern for urgency in that it is better for religious thought to 
engage the debate on moral enhancement sooner rather than later since 
“faith communities are not going to be neutral on moral questions, nor upon 
questions regarding moral formation” (141).
But why does he pick Christianity? The reason, it is said, is purely prac-
tical as he believes that “Simply put, there is a familiarity with the Western 
audience with matters of Christian faith, much of which is absorbed by os-
mosis, and often unconsciously and anonymously” (140). He doesn’t aim to 
put the Christian approach as the supreme approach but merely as one with 
which many thinkers are acquainted. Still, just a bit later he introduces the 
notion of Christian generosity, “the outward-facing” focus as an antidote to 
the “self-obsession and tremendous anxiety” (145) which results from the 
self-absorbed contemporary culture’s way of life. So perhaps the Christian 
approach is not here as just the most practical option but also serves as 
a critique of the contemporary culture and resembles previous Christian 
critiques of transhumanist philosophy and enhancement in general. Addi-
tionally, as is presented later on in the text, it seems that the Christian 
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community has the greatest generative power and overall functionality to 
foster a virtue-based remedy-like approach to moral enhancement which 
Wiseman espouses and thus, it seems, Wiseman’s reason of choice goes be-
yond a practical “secular familiarity” with Christianity.
Still, before presenting us with his main proposal Wiseman once again 
reiterates his already well-established critique of unrealistic ME scenarios. 
And he wishes to deal them a fi nal blow by confi rming the inadequacy of 
biomedical approaches to solve those dimensions of morality which are com-
pletely out of their scope or category such as the “context, ambiguity, moral 
scaffolding, the predisposition of will” (189). For instance, concerning the 
context or ambiguity of moral goods, he cleverly remarks that “none of the 
enthusiasts in the philosophical literature want to get inside the heads of 
those who are to be enhanced. Yet people are motivated by different things, 
they understand their moral goods in different ways, and they need to be 
spoken to in different ways” (180). And on the issue of scaffolding: “moral 
enhancement might help augment a given vision of the good, but it cannot 
itself create a vision of the good” (185). 
This conclusion is in line with his priory emphasized anti-reductionist 
stand but this time it is reinforced with regards to religious moral beliefs: 
“the empirical work conducted on ‘the moral brain’, makes no reference at 
all to the manner in which a person’s religious faith may or may not be mod-
ulating their responses to the various tests that are applied” (147). This also 
serves as foreshadowing the socio-political acceptance of moral enhance-
ment within the religious landscape: “a strong vision of moral enhancement 
must by implication propose some rationale for...contributing to the salva-
tory structures idiosyncratic to the faith traditions of those upon whom such 
strong visions of moral enhancement are to be impressed” (147). This ties 
in directly with the discussion and the distinction on the voluntary/compul-
sory enhancement since one could presume that a religious person would 
also seek religious (in between other) reasons when deciding to voluntarily 
pursue moral enhancement. In addition, policymakers would have to take 
into consideration religious sensitives when engaging enhancement possi-
bilities. Wiseman believes that what is important to have in mind in both 
of these cases is that we cannot devise a general like solution applicable to 
each and all but that “we need to be asking which particular  intervention 
is best understood in voluntary terms and why the particular facts on the 
ground make things so” (203).  This conclusion is especially important if we 
recall that the true problem with a compulsory general-like moral enhance-
ment of the population is not only in the inability of the neuropharmacology 
to achieve such a precise level and intricacy of interaction with our biologi-
cal systems—for instance by providing to the entire population an “empathy 
pill” but that even if we could do so (and we cannot) we must remember 
that certain emotional states which humans exhibit are there for an (evo-
lutionary) reason—more often than not as a fail-safe survival mechanism. 
As such, if one would follow the idea to its end we might come to see, as I 
call it, the birth of an Eloi society. As the famous Eloi, the surface dwellers 
of the far future Earth depicted in the H. G. Wells Time Machine show, a 
being completely lacking the capacity to express anger or aggressiveness 
even if just to defend itself is a sitting duck in a world of evolutionary sur-
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vival and predation (Prinz, 2011). And although Eloi, as well as Morlocks, 
were engaged in literal survival and predation, where Morlocks used Eloi as 
food, our own world is fraught with survival and predation with the differ-
ence that we, true enough, don’t literally each other. As Wiseman remarks: 
„What use is an intervention to generate empathy in a society which re-
wards and valorizes cruel, self-serving, aggressively competitive behavior?” 
(187).
And maybe this is the main reason why Wiseman wants to incorporate 
the biomedical procedures within a virtue-based character development in-
side a communal Christian narrative. If I am interpreting his intentions 
right, it seems that if we cannot opt for a global compulsory approach (due 
to its obvious problems) and neither can we rest our hopes upon the volun-
tary approach since the majority is not interested in moral enhancement 
at all—the only viable solution we are left with is the arduous “renewal” of 
society from within. And this moral enhancement renewal, it is presumed, 
could be achieved by the Christian community since it could create the co-
hesive and generative power to venture forward towards a realistic goal of a 
morally enhanced humanity. Be it as it is, his vision of the remedial moral 
enhancement proposal “one in which a biomedical intervention takes place 
in a mental health context, in a person-centered and fully bio-psycho-social 
fashion, one which respects the value and infl uence of personal agency, 
cultural scaffolding, and quality relationships” (220) should be applauded. 
Still, as he is fully aware, problems remain. As is the case with all inter-
personal and group dynamics, the ones in charge are the ones who have 
the greatest infl uence in determining the outcome of the procedure. Since 
Wiseman requests a communitarian approach, with healthcare experts and 
counselors aiding or guiding the process of moral formation and providing 
the necessary scaffolding or moral motivation to the individual—a natural 
question arises: “Who then watches the watchers?”.
Wiseman is aware of the problem but is not able to provide a direct solu-
tion instead of pointing out that “we need responsible institutions in place, 
along with healthcare professionals who are not swayed by ... inappropriate 
shortcuts and easy remedies to complex problems” (223). And this leads me 
to a concluding remark in which I am left to wonder is Wiseman’s proposal 
fulfi lling or limiting the vision offered to us by moral enhancement?  Surely, 
Wiseman gives his best in giving thorough argumentation why exactly cur-
rently present neuropharmacological means to moral enhancement will not 
be able to do the trick. And he does it successfully. Still, one is left to won-
der if in pointing out all the faults and lacks the neuropharmacological ap-
proach holds both in its science and philosophical interpretation Wiseman 
doesn’t leave us with much in striving for and achieving the grand vision 
of moral enhancement. According to Wiseman, it seems that the sobering 
reality of human biology, the complexity of the socio-political landscape and 
intricacy of even our everyday human morality calls us to reconsider our 
moral enhancement proposals to “sacrifi ce fantasy for something that might 
actually be of use, here and now” (226). But I cannot shake the idea that 
this approach no matter how much it works to be as realistic as possible, in 
its fervor for realism loses the hope beyond the horizon. The vision of moral 
enhancement has to be able to provide us with more than simply putting 
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it all, like so many times in the past, on the back of the individual. Un-
fortunately, for Wiseman the project of moral enhancement “is absolutely 
dependent upon the efforts and will of the person so enhancing” (279). Even 
if provided with a community to support the incentive and the lack of mo-
tivation by providing a safe guidance of a counselor, or a moral doctor, and 
if necessary administering remedy-like pharmacological means (Nalmefene 
and alcoholism example (233)) it all rests once again on the individual will, 
on the individual openness to attain or not to attain moral enhancement. 
So, as it seems, everything within the process has an instrumental role 
while the will of the individual determines the success of the procedure. And 
this conclusion is not something I can agree a moral enhancement vision 
should be built upon for the simple reason it lacks the capacity to enhance 
that what needs enhancing the most—human will. Surely neuropharma-
cology alone cannot be deemed as a “one size fi ts all” solution or even an 
effi ciently applicable solution but the lacking’s of the neuropharmacological 
approach do not entail our incapacity to accomplish a grand vision of moral 
enhancement. And although the complexity of the moral life far exceeds 
the narrative neuroscience and neuropharmacology can currently provide 
us with, that doesn’t mean we are doomed to remain at the level of the in-
dividual effort while trying to accomplish this most noteworthy goal. And 
what could help us achieve such a goal—technology and science? Yes, but 
not biomedical.
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